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culminates in Aristotle’s best or ideal regime of books 7 and 8 and in his effort
to understand “how this inquiry into the ideal, and how political philosophy
in general, could be practical” (172).
Garver’s interpretation of the Politics makes for dense reading, but his study
captures the complexity of the relations among political philosophy, practical
wisdom, and political action in Aristotle’s own thought. The book concludes
with an epilogue that focuses on what is central to this thought: the claim that
human beings are political animals. In drawing out ﬁve different senses in
which we can understand this claim, and especially by showing how the
Politics itself informs enduring political questions, Garver thinks through
the ways in which philosophy can be practical without being subsumed by
practical ends. Garver’s ﬁne study is clearly the fruit of deep reﬂection on
this very problem.
–Susan D. Collins
University of Notre Dame

THESIS, ANTITHESIS, SYNTHESIS
Jeffrey Reiman: As Free and as Just as Possible: The Theory of Marxian Liberalism. (West
Sussex, UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012. Pp. vii, 241.)
doi:10.1017/S0034670513000417

Liberal theorists have good reasons to fear socialism. Socialist remedies for
capitalism’s ills have underwritten a dramatic expansion of state power
with its consequent dangers for liberty and prosperity. Does liberalism—the
tradition of political thinking originating in Locke’s writings—still have anything to learn from socialism, and speciﬁcally from Marx’s thought? Reiman’s
book offers a positive answer. His central thesis is that liberalism’s commitment to individual liberty will be vindicated only if it incorporates critical
Marxian insights. The resulting synthesis—Marxian Liberalism—secures
the fullest possible principles of justice and the widest scope for liberty that
historical circumstances permit.
The central Marxian insight missing from the liberal core is the claim that
capitalist property is coercive. Liberal theorists have provided persuasive
defenses of the critical role private property and markets play in protecting
liberty: property in one’s labor eliminated premodern forms of personal
dependence; property in things and enforceable contracts allow individuals
to realize their purposes; markets deﬁne one of the principal boundaries
between public and private domains of activity, limiting the state’s reach;
decentralized forms of ownership allow for multiple points of independent
economic decision-making; capital markets underwrite economic prosperity,
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creating a richer material culture and freeing people from drudgery. In
Reiman’s view, however, liberal theorists suffer from a recurring blindness:
they normally equate coercion with political oppression and physical violence, failing to recognize that capitalist property is also coercive, frustrating
the liberal promise.
Reiman rightly points out that Marx’s Capital develops a theory of private
property’s distinctive threat to liberty. The liberal state is charged with ensuring that contracts are voluntary and bilaterally informed, ensuring that the
exchange of commodities remains a realm of individual choice. But Marx
claimed, persuasively, that markets also legitimize and obscure a realm of
coercion involving the sale and purchase of a peculiar commodity—labor
power. The deﬁning characteristic of capitalist labor relations—the wage contract—is predicated on a double freedom: workers are free in the sense that
they own their persons and thus voluntarily enter into exchange relations,
and in the ironic sense that they are shorn of all productive property, and
thus have no choice but to work for capitalists. Reiman generalizes Marx’s
insight: capitalism’s property relations create a system of “social subjugation”
whereby a majority of individuals are forced by their material circumstances
to work for others in unequal amounts (162).
On this view, Marx’s critique of property can be safely accommodated
within liberal theory. Reiman calls his contribution Marxian Liberalism, and
not Liberal Marxism, to highlight its commitment to protecting and promoting liberty. He offers a version of liberalism, not a new interpretation of Marx.
Other than a short discussion of the dispute over whether Marx offered a
meaningful theory of justice (Reiman thinks he did), this book makes no
mention of the various debates over Marx’s social and political thought.
Nor is there any mention of recent theories of market socialism. Reiman
accepts private ownership of the means of production, at least for the foreseeable future. He fears, for good liberal reasons, that state control is dangerous.
But property must be subject to the requirements of justice to eradicate its
coercive aspects. Reiman’s liberalism is essentially Rawls’s: he adopts the original position, the veil of ignorance, the principles of justice and the lexical
order governing them, and a property-owning democracy as the most practicable just society.
The most innovative chapter of this book (chapter 5) deploys Marx’s theory
of exploitation to shore up a widely perceived weakness in Rawls’s difference
principle. Critics have underscored that Rawls’s theory of distributive justice
is unfair in that it demands greater sacriﬁces from the more advantaged than
from the less advantaged groups. Reiman argues that a moral version of
Marx’s theory of value provides the necessary support missing from
Rawls’s difference principle. Marx’s labor theory shows that underlying the
exchange of commodities in the marketplace is the exchange of labor.
Society in its economic dimension is a system of cooperation whereby
people labor to provide one another with their daily recurring wants.
Reiman adopts a sharply egalitarian standard of justice. The benchmark of
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a just economic transaction is one where individuals exchange roughly equal
quantities of labor. Exploitation, or social subjugation, refers to a situation in
which capitalist property relations require disadvantaged workers to enter
into unequal labor exchanges with the owners of productive assets—that is,
to “agree” to turn over unpaid labor to capitalists as a condition of employment. Now, as Reimain points out, it may be rational for wage workers to
consent to their exploitation, but if and only if, under current economic circumstances, an unequal exchange of labor offers society’s more talented
people the incentive to maximize productivity, improving workers’ standard
of living and freeing them from unwanted toil (what Reiman calls their
material subjugation). Any greater economic inequality, beyond the degree
necessary to increase productivity, is a product of property relations that
empower owners of productive property to coerce nonowners to work for
them without providing any reciprocal beneﬁt. Owners may not justly
claim a greater share of other people’s labor than that necessary as an incentive to maximize productivity. Nor, therefore, is it unfair to redistribute this
share of unpaid labor—in the form of wealth—to the least advantaged. To
be sure, the precise tipping point at which redistribution hampers productivity can only be worked out in practice, as different societies experiment
with various ways to implement the requirements of the difference principle.
Reiman also argues that technological improvement and the material abundance it produces will in the distant future reduce the need for incentives
and thus eliminate the need for economic inequality. It will then be possible
to move from a liberal to a communist standard of justice: from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs.
Reiman’s book repays careful reading. But there are also signiﬁcant gaps in
its argument. The most serious is the claim, made repeatedly, that liberal theorists largely focus on political oppression and physical coercion, evincing a
characteristic blindness to the structural coercion inherent in capitalist property relations that only an appeal to Marx can correct (see 5, 11, 23–25, 31–32,
94, 161–62, 210–11). To be sure, Reiman often qualiﬁes his critique of liberalism by indicating that he is referring to “traditional liberalism” or to “libertarianism,” and he recognizes that twentieth-century liberals turned their
attention to the need to protect people from poverty (12). But there is nevertheless no serious engagement with the history of liberal thought. Thus, for
example, in chapter 4, devoted to a discussion of liberal theory, Reiman
jumps from Locke and Kant to Nozick and Narveson, bypassing the liberal
innovations of (to name a few) J. S. Mill, L. T. Hobhouse, John A. Hobson,
John Dewey, Robert Hale, and C. B. Macpherson. These authors show that liberals have been engaged in the task of incorporating the insight that capitalist
property is coercive for over a century. Liberalism is far richer than Reiman
suggests. His book is the latest contribution to a very long tradition.
–Claudio J. Katz
Loyola University Chicago

